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Abstract
Background: To probe seroepidemiology of the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) among health care workers
(HCWs) in a children’s hospital.
Methods: From August 2009 to March 2010, serum samples were drawn from 150 HCWs in a children’s hospital in
Taipei before the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic, before H1N1 vaccination, and after the pandemic. HCWs who
had come into direct contact with 2009 influenza A (H1N1) patients or their clinical respiratory samples during
their daily work were designated as a high-risk group. Antibody levels were determined by hemagglutination
inhibition (HAI) assay. A four-fold or greater increase in HAI titers between any successive paired sera was defined
as seroconversion, and factors associated with seroconversion were analyzed.
Results: Among the 150 HCWs, 18 (12.0%) showed either virological or serological evidence of 2009 pandemic
influenza A (H1N1) infection. Of the 90 unvaccinated HCWs, baseline and post-pandemic seroprotective rates were
5.6% and 20.0%. Seroconversion rates among unvaccinated HCWs were 14.4% (13/90), 22.5% (9/40), and 8.0% (4/
50) for total, high-risk group, and low-risk group, respectively. Multivariate analysis revealed being in the high-risk
group is an independent risk factor associated with seroconversion.
Conclusion: The infection rate of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) in HCWs was moderate and not higher than
that for the general population. The majority of unvaccinated HCWs remained susceptible. Direct contact of
influenza patients and their respiratory samples increased the risk of infection.
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Background
Since its identification in April 2009 in the USA and
Mexico, the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus
has caused significant morbidity and mortality around
the world [1]. Most illnesses prove acute and self-
limited, highest attack rates are concentrated among
children and young adults [2]. Mechanisms of person-
to-person transmission of the 2009 H1N1 influenza
virus appear similar to those of seasonal influenza [2].
In light of medical knowledge derived from past experi-
ence with seasonal influenza, health care workers
(HCWs), especially those taking care of sick children,
run substantial risk of acquiring influenza [3,4]. To pre-
vent transmission of 2009 H1N1 influenza in healthcare
settings, US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
recommend that health facilities take preventive mea-
sures like elimination of potential exposure, engineering
control, administrative control, personal protective
equipment (PPE), and vaccination [5]. Prevalence of
2009 H1N1 infections and efficacy of these preventive
strategies among HCWs remain unclear.
Taiwan, a sub-tropical East Asia country with a popula-
tion of 23 million, experienced two epidemic waves of
2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) [6]. The first began
in early July and ended in late September 2009. A second
began in October or November 2009, then significantly
declined after December, perhaps due to mass vaccina-
tion [7]. We initiated a prospective cohort study, using
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antibodies against 2009 influenza A (H1N1) among
HCWs before, during, and after the 2009-2010 influenza
seasons in Taiwan. The study targeted the seroepidemiol-
ogy of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) in HCWs,
along with efficacy of personal protective equipment and
v a c c i n a t i o ni np r e v e n t i o no ft r a n s m i s s i o na m o n gH C W s
in a children’s hospital.
Methods
Design
In early August of 2009, we initiated a prospective cohort
study in which HCWs in a children’sh o s p i t a lw e r e
r e c r u i t e da n df o l l o w e du po nu n t i lt h el a t es t a g eo ft h e
pandemic in early March, 2010. Three serial serum sam-
ples were collected from each participant. A baseline
sample was collected in early August 2009, a time frame
which more or less coincided with the early phase of the
2009 influenza A (H1N1) epidemic in Taiwan. The sec-
ond sample was collected in late October 2009, around
four weeks after the first epidemic peak and just before
implementation of the monovalent 2009 pandemic influ-
enza A (H1N1) vaccination program. The third sample
was collected in early March 2010, about four weeks after
the second epidemic wave had subsided. Hemagglutina-
tion inhibition (HAI) assay determined antibody levels
for 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1).
A questionnaire collected information on demographic
data, history of influenza-like illnesses (ILI), history of
influenza vaccination, and PPE (mainly surgical masks)
usage. An ILI was defined as fever higher than 38°C and a
cough and/or sore throat in the absence of a known cause
other than influenza. Participants were asked to actively
report all recent onset ILI or other acute respiratory ill-
nesses, such as rhinorrhea, nasal congestion, sore throat,
or cough. The date of each illness episode was defined as
the earliest symptom onset date or sickness absenteeism if
onset dates were unavailable. Whether such episodes met
t h eI L Ic r i t e r i aw a sj u d g e db yo n eo ft h ei n v e s t i g a t o r s .
Once ILI was diagnosed, throat swabs for viral isolation
and real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR) for 2009
pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus were immediately per-
formed to confirm the diagnosis. Acute respiratory epi-
sodes which did not meet criteria of ILI were categorized
as acute respiratory illness. Self-reported level of personal
protective equipment and hand hygiene adherence was
rated by a five-point Likert scale [8]. Adherence was classi-
fied as optimal if the response was “always” or “often.”
Setting and study subjects
The National Taiwan University Hospital (NTUH) in
Taipei is a major tertiary referral medical center contain-
ing 2,600 beds and providing medical care to about 7,000
outpatients daily. Staff members (aged 20-60 years) at the
children’s hospital (NTUCH, part of NTUH), which has
460 pediatric beds, were recruited through word-of-
mouth referral. They worked on a daily basis from
August 2009 through March 2010. They were divided
into two groups based on risk of contracting influenza A
(H1N1) infection. The high-risk group included staff that
would come into direct contact with 2009 pandemic
influenza A (H1N1) patients or their respiratory samples.
This group mainly consisted of pediatricians, nurses, and
medical technicians who took care of patients or handled
their clinical respiratory samples in the pediatric emer-
gency, out-patient, or laboratory departments. The low-
risk group included staff members (mainly nurses and
laboratory technicians) whose daily work requires no
direct contact with ILI patients or clinical specimens.
During the study period, all ILI patients were tested for
influenza A and B viruses by rapid test (QuickVue Influ-
enza Test) for early identification. Droplet precautions like
isolation, cohorting of patients, and use of surgical masks
for both patients with ILI and HCWs were routinely imple-
mented as per the policy set by the Taiwan Centers for
Disease Control. Certain HCWs used N95 masks by perso-
nal preference when in direct contact with suspected or
confirmed 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) patients.
NTUCH offers annual trivalent, inactivated influenza vac-
cines and supplied monovalent inactivated 2009 influenza
A (H1N1) vaccines [9,10] free of charge to hospital staff in
2009. Monovalent H1N1 vaccines are highly recommended
but not compulsory for HCWs. Vaccine campaigns and
infection control training courses were implemented dur-
ing the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic.
Determining 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) antibody
Hemagglutination inhibition (HAI) assay determined anti-
body levels against 2009 influenza A/California/7/2009 A
(H1N1). Drawn blood was centrifuged to separate serum,
which was immediately frozen and stored at -80°C for
later use. The HAI assay was performed by one experi-
enced technician according to standard protocol: 50 uL of
serially diluted (2-fold serially diluted, starting from
10-fold dilution) serum was incubated with equal volume
of A/California/07/2009 influenza virus containing 8 HA
units for 30 minutes at room temperature. Then 50 uL
0.75% suspension of chicken red blood cells were added to
the mixture and incubated for another 30 minutes. Extent
of hemagglutination was visually inspected and the highest
dilution capable of agglutinating red blood cells deter-
mined. All samples were tested in duplicate, titers
expressed as the reciprocal of highest dilution of serum
where hemagglutination was prevented. A titer was
defined as seroprotective with a HAI antibody titer > = 40,
a titer representing the level at which approximately 50%
of individuals will be protected [11]. Seroconversion was
defined as having a four-fold or greater increase in HAI
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diagnosis of 2009 influenza A (H1N1) infection was made
based on positive viral culture, real time polymerase chain
reaction from a throat swab, or seroconversion detected in
blood samples.
Definition of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infection
Laboratory diagnosis of H1N1 relied on either virologi-
cal or serological tests. Subjects with positive virological
tests, either virus isolation or real time PCR from throat
swabs, were defined as virologically confirmed 2009 pan-
demic influenza A (H1N1) infections. Subjects having
seroconversions were defined as having serological evi-
dence of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infection.
Subjects with any of the above were defined as having
laboratory evidence of H1N1 infection.
Epidemiology of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) in
Taiwan
In April 2009, the Taiwan Center for Disease Control
added 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infection to its
list of reportable diseases [12]. Throat swab samples from
suspected cases were sent to reference laboratories for
confirmation. A figure was plotted to show the number of
confirmed cases of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1)
infection from May 2009 to April 2010 in Taiwan. ILI epi-
sodes and laboratory-confirmed 2009 pandemic influenza
A (H1N1) infections in our study subjects were also com-
pared against influenza epidemic activity in Taiwan in the
same figure by date.
Statistical analysis
Geometric mean titers (GMT) were calculated for HAI
titers. Value of 5 was assigned for HAI titers below 10 and
1280 for titers of 1280 or higher while calculating GMT.
Comparisons of paired samples used Wilcoxon-signed
rank tests, and Mann-Whitney tests were used to compare
two independent samples. Fisher’s exact test compared
proportions; Chi-square tests were used for independent
cases, two-tailed p values below 0.05 are considered statis-
tically significant. We performed univariate and multivari-
ate logistic regression using these variables alongside
baseline titer, age, sex, 2009 pandemic influenza A vaccine
status, high-risk group, ILI history, 2009 pandemic influ-
enza infection history, optimal surgical mask usage, and
hand hygiene status to gauge their contribution to sero-
conversion and 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infec-
tion rates. Odds ratios (ORs) with asymptotic Wald 95%
confidence intervals (CIs) and two-tailed p values are
plotted with statistical significance set at 0.05. Multivariate
analysis entailed stepwise logistic regression, wherein vari-
ables that did not improve model fit at p < 0.10 were dis-
carded. Data analyses used the Statistical Package for
Social Sciences (SPSS version 16.0).
Ethics
The study was approved by the Institutional Review
Board of National Taiwan University Hospital. Written
informed consent was obtained from all participants.
Results
Demography
In total, 282 HCWs in NTUCH were assessed for eligibil-
ity; 154 agreed to participate. They were then assigned to
high- (95 participants) or low-risk groups (59 partici-
pants) according to degree of exposure to 2009 influenza
A (H1N1) in their working environment. Two partici-
pants in each group withdrew after the first blood sam-
pling. Finally, 150 participants completed questionnaires
and supplied at least two blood samples (93 high-risk and
57 low-risk) (Figure 1). The timing of blood sampling
and its relationship with the epidemic waves of 2009 pan-
demic influenza A (H1N1) infection from May 2009 to
April 2010 in Taiwan were shown in Figure 2. Basic
demographic traits of participants are listed in Table 1.
Participants were apparently healthy; seven had history of
asthma, and two had hypertension. No participant
received an immunosuppressive agent during the study.
The average age of participants was younger in the high-
risk group, with more females in the low-risk group. Sig-
nificantly higher proportions of high-risk participants
received 2009 inactivated trivalent seasonal and monova-
lent H1N1 influenza vaccination. Optimal surgical mask
and hand hygiene were also more often adopted in the
high-risk group (Table 1). Very few participants used
N95 masks regularly during clinical work.
Figure 1 Flow diagram for study design and grouping of
healthcare workers into high- and low-risk groups.
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Page 3 of 9Figure 2 Number of study subjects with influenza-like illness and laboratory-confirmed 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infections
were plotted over an epidemic curve of confirmed 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) cases in Taiwan. The first epidemic wave began
in late August and ended in September 2009; the second occurred between mid October 2009 and February 2010. Gray boxes indicate first,
second, and third blood sampling periods. Hollow arrows indicate when a nationwide vaccination with monovalent 2009 pandemic influenza A
(H1N1) vaccine was implemented.
Table 1 Demographics, vaccination history, and personal protection adherence of 150 health care workers at a
children’s hospital during the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic in Taiwan
Characteristics All (N = 150)
No. (%)
High risk (N = 93)
No. (%)
Low risk (N = 57)
No. (%)
P value
2
Age, mean ± SD [range], year 31.8 ± 6.3[22-59] 30.8 ± 5.8 [23-59] 33.5 ± 6.8 [23-51] 0.008
Male: Female 34:116 28:65 6:51 0.005
Vaccinated with
2009 seasonal influenza vaccine 77 (51.3%) 60 (64.5%) 17 (29.8%) < 0.001
2009 H1N1 influenza vaccine 60 (40.0%) 53 (57.0%) 7 (12.3%) < 0.001
Optimal PPE
N95 mask 5 (3.3%) 5 (5.4%) 0 (0%) 0.157
Surgical mask 133 (88.7%) 93 (100%) 40 (70.2%) < 0.001
Hand hygiene 143 (95.3%) 93 (100%) 50 (87.7%) < 0.001
Comparisons were made between high- and low-risk groups
1
Abbreviations: SD, standard deviation; PPE, personal protective equipment.
1 See text for definition of high- and low-risk groups.
2 P values were calculated by Chi-square test or Fisher exact test to compare the difference between high-risk and low-risk groups.
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Figure 2 plots the temporal relation between the num-
bers of our study subjects who have ILI or laboratory
evidence of 2009 influenza A (H1N1) infections and sta-
tistics of laboratory-confirmed cases of 2009 influenza A
(H1N1) nationwide. Nationwide, laboratory-confirmed
2009 influenza A (H1N1) cases rose rapidly in August
2009 and dropped after December 2010. A decline in
confirmed cases appeared some three weeks after the
implementation of 2009 monovalent H1N1 vaccinations.
Table 2 summarizes the history of acute respiratory ill-
ness and laboratory evidence of participating HCWs.
Very few participants (13, 8.7%) reported ILI between the
first and second blood samplings, and only eight (5.3%)
participants had either virological or serological evidence
of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infection before
the second blood sampling. No significant difference in
seroconversion rates from first to second sampling
(before vaccination) was found between high- and low-
risk groups (5.4% versus 1.8%, p = 0.41).
Of all HCWs, 30% (45/150) reported ILI after the study
period, the majority (60.0%, 27/45) showing no laboratory
evidence of influenza. Overall, eighteen (12.0%) out of
150 HCWs showed laboratory evidence of 2009 pan-
demic influenza A (H1N1) infections. Among HCWs not
vaccinated with the monovalent 2009 H1N1 influenza
vaccine (N = 90), fifteen (16.7%) had laboratory evidence
of infection; eight (8.9%) were virologically confirmed,
and thirteen (14.4%) showed serological evidence. Vacci-
nated HCWs had significantly lower incidence of 2009
H1N1 influenza infection with laboratory evidence than
unvaccinated ones (5.0% vs.1 6 . 7 % ,P=0 . 0 4 ) .W h i l e
twenty five (27.8%) of all unvaccinated participants
reported ILI episodes after the study, only fifteen (16.7%)
showed laboratory evidence of H1N1 influenza infection.
Unvaccinated high-risk HCWs had slightly higher chance
of having laboratory evidence of 2009 H1N1 influenza
infection than the low-risk group (25.0 and 10.0%,
respectively); this difference was not statistically signifi-
cant (p = 0.087).
Seroprotection, seroconversion, and associated factors
A total of 147 participants completed three serial serum
collections. Three high-risk participants completed two
blood samples but refused the third. All 150 participants
were included in serology analysis (Table 3); sixty received
monovalent 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) vaccina-
tions. Baseline and post pandemic seroprotective rates
were 5.6% and 20.0%, respectively, for unvaccinated sub-
jects (N = 90). In total, 14.4% (13/90) of unvaccinated sub-
jects showed seroconversion. Six showed during the first
pandemic wave; two had virologically confirmed infection
but no detectable seroconversion.
Of the sixty HCWs who received monovalent H1N1
influenza vaccinations in November 2009, the pre-vaccina-
tion seroprotective rate was 3.3%. All seroconversion
occurred after vaccination during second and third blood
samplings. GMT significantly increased (from 11.4 to
31.4) during this time period; seroprotective rate was
56.7% (34/60) in March 2010. Two participants (2/60,
3.3%) had virologically confirmed 2009 pandemic influ-
enza A (H1N1) infections within two weeks after vaccina-
tion. No 2009 H1N1 influenza infections were confirmed
among this group after December 2009. Comparison
between high- and low-risk unvaccinated HCWs showed
the high-risk group with slightly higher seroprotective
rates (30.0 versus 12.0%, p = 0.061), slightly higher sero-
conversion rate (22.5 versus 8.0%, p = 0.071), and signifi-
cantly higher GMT (18.3 versus 11.3% respectively, p =
0.003) in the third serum samples (Table 3). The propor-
tion of HCWs who received monovalent 2009 influenza A
(H1N1) vaccination was higher among high-risk than low-
risk participants (57.0 vs. 12.3%, Table 1).
Table 4 shows univariate and multivariate analysis of
risk factors linked with seroconversion for ninety unvacci-
nated HCWs. Being in the high-risk group was an inde-
pendent factor associated with final seroconversion
[adjusted OR, 6.51; 95% confidence interval (CI), 1.13-
37.52; p = 0.036) (Table 4). HCWs with ILI or virologically
confirmed 2009 influenza A (H1N1) infection were signifi-
cantly associated seroconversion. Factors such as baseline
anti-H1N1 titer, optimal surgical mask usage or hand
hygiene did not significantly correlate with seroconversion
in both univariate and multivariate analysis. Multivariate
analysis for risk factors of virologically confirmed 2009
influenza A (H1N1) infection in unvaccinated HCWs
proved ILI episodes as independently associated with viro-
logically confirmed infection (adjusted OR, 15.10; 95% CI,
2.51-90.85, p = 0.003). The high-risk group exhibited
higher chance of virologically confirmed infection
(adjusted OR, 3.12; 95% CI, 0.88-11.03; p = 0.077).
Discussion
S i n c et h ew o r l d w i d ep a n d e m i co f2 0 0 9i n f l u e n z aA
(H1N1) virus, studies on the risk of infection for health-
care workers have burgeoned: e.g., a prospective seroepi-
demiologic cohort study done in Singapore, 6.6% (35/
531) on HCWs showing seroconversion during the pan-
demic [13]. Another cross-sectional study in Hong Kong
revealed 12% of 599 HCWs had antibody titers that
were seroprotective against the virus after the first wave
of the pandemic [14]. In one study from Australia,
19.9% of 231 frontline HCWs had positive antibody titer
against the virus [15]. Yet studies on the prevalence and
seroepidemiology of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1)
in HCWs taking care of children remain limited. By
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Page 5 of 9Table 2 History of acute respiratory illness, including influenza-like illness (ILI), and laboratory evidence of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infections in
60 vaccinated with a monovalent 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1) vaccine and 90 unvaccinated healthcare workers at a children’s hospital during and after
2009 acute H1N1 influenza pandemic in Taiwan
All
(N = 150)
Vaccinated Unvaccinated
All (N = 60)
No. (%)
High risk
1 (N = 53)
No. (%)
Low risk
1 (N = 7)
No. (%)
P value
2 All (N = 90)
No. (%)
High risk
1 (N = 40)
No. (%)
Low risk
1 (N = 50)
No. (%)
P value
2
Age, mean ± SD [range], year 31.8 ± 6.3[22-59] 31.7 ± 5.8[24-59] 31.8 ± 5.8[27-59] 31.1 ± 6.2[24-42] 0.534 31.8 ± 6.7[23-58] 29.5 ± 5.5[23-58] 33.9 ± 6.9[23-51] < 0.001
Male: Female 34:116 16:44 16:37 0:7 0.173 18:72 12:28 6:44 0.061
History of respiratory illness
Before 1
st serum
Acute respiratory illness 23 (15.3%) 16 (26.7%) 11 (20.8%) 5 (71.4%) 0.012 7 (7.8%) 3 (7.5%) 4 (8.0%) 1
ILI episodes 9 (6.0%) 5 (8.3%) 3 (5.7%) 2 (28.6%) 0.100 4 (4.4%) 2 (5.0%) 2 (4.0%) 1
2009 H1N1 infection
3 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) NA 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) NA
Between 1
st &2
nd sera
Acute respiratory illness 54 (36%) 21 (35.0%) 18 (34.0%) 3 (42.9%) 0.687 33 (36.7%) 15 (37.5%) 18 (36.0%) 1
ILI episode 13 (8.7%) 5 (8.3%) 5 (9.4%) 0(0%) 1 8 (8.9%) 6 (15.0%) 2 (4.0%) 0.132
2009 H1N1 infection
3 8 (5.3%) 1 (1.7%) 1 (1.9%) 0(0%) 1 7 (7.8%) 5 (12.5%) 2 (4.0%) 0.235
Virologically confirmed
4 5 (3.3%) 1 (1.7%) 1 (1.9%) 0(%)) 1 4 (4.4%) 3 (7.5%) 1 (2.0%) 0.319
With serological evidence
5 6 (4.0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 0(0%) 1 6 (6.7%) 5 (12.5%) 1 (2.0%) 0.085
Between 2
nd &3
rd sera
Acute respiratory illness 57 (38%) 24 (40.0%) 21 (39.6%) 3 (42.9%) 1 33 (36.7%) 15 (37.5%) 18 (36.0%) 1
ILI episodes 23 (15.3%) 10 (16.6%) 9 (17.0%) 1 (14.3%) 1 13 (14.4%) 7 (17.5%) 6 (12.0%) 0.552
2009 H1N1 infection
3 10 (6.7%) 2 (3.3%) 2 (3.8%) 0 (0%) 1 8 (8.9%) 5 (12.5%) 3 (6.0%) 0.458
Virologically confirmed
4 6 (4.0%) 2 (3.3%) 2 (3.8%) 0 (0%) 1 4 (4.4%) 2 (5.0%) 2 (4.0%) 1
With serological evidence
5 7 (4.7%) NA NA NA NA 7 (7.8%) 4 (10.0%) 3 (6.0%) 0.695
Abbreviations: NA, not applicable; SD, standard deviation; ILI, influenza-like illness
1 See text for definition of high- and low-risk groups
2 P values were calculated by Chi-square test or Fisher exact test to compare high- and low-risk groups.
3 2009 H1N1 infection means subjects with laboratory evidence, either positive viral isolation, positive real time polymerase chain reaction, or seroconversion, of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infection.
4 Virologically confirmed means either viral isolation or real-time polymerase chain reaction was positive of 2009 pandemic influenza (H1N1) virus.
5 With serological evidence with seroconversion or four fold rise of antibodies against 2009 pandemic influenza (H1N1) virus.
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9showing seroconversion, ourl o n g i t u d i n a lf o l l o w - u p
cohort study further pinpointed 14.4% (13/90) of
Taiwan’s unvaccinated HCWs as infected during the pan-
demic. Even with virological evidence, only 16.7% (15/90)
of all unvaccinated HCWs had laboratory evidence of
infection in this study. The majority of HCWs in Taiwan
remained susceptible.
The psychosocial impact of the 2009 pandemic was
great; HCWs were under tremendous stress taking care of
infected patients because they are regarded high-risk for
contracting the virus. Our study showed moderate overall
infection rates among HCWs, surprisingly no higher than
that of household contacts of an index case with pandemic
influenza. Chao DY et al. calculated a 19% seroconversion
rate during April-July and October-November 2009
among 147 household contacts (mean age: 39.34, range:
25-60) with schoolchildren in Taiwan [6]. A report from
Hong Kong claimed no sharp difference in incidence
between clinical versus non-clinical staff among 1,158 con-
firmed 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infections in
HCWs [15]. Current preventive strategies like proper use
of surgical masks, hand hygiene, and vaccination afford
HCWs partial protection against influenza. A large-scale
serological study from four distinct cohorts in Singapore,
showed seroconversion rates even lower for HCWs (6.5%)
than the general population (13.5%) or military personnel
(29.4%) [16]. One prospective sero-epidemiological cohort
in Singapore also reported seroconversion among health
Table 3 Results of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) antibodies before and after the pandemic in 60 vaccinated and
90 unvaccinated health care workers at a children’s hospital in Taiwan
All (N = 150) Vaccinated (N = 60)
No. (%)
Unvaccinated (N = 90)
All
No. (%)
High-risk (N = 40)
3
No. (%)
Low-risk (N = 50)
3
No. (%)
P value
1
Seroprotective
Baseline
2 7 (4.7%) 2 (3.3%) 5 (5.6%) 3 (7.5%) 2 (4.0%) 0.652
Second
2 13 (8.7%) 2 (3.3%) 11 (12.2%) 8 (20.0%) 3 (6.0%) 0.056
Third
2 52 (35.4%) 34 (56.7%) 18 (20.0%) 12 (30.0%) 6(12.0%) 0.061
Seroconversion
1st to 2nd sera 6 (4.0%) 0 (0.0%) 6 (6.7%) 5 (12.5%) 1 (2.0%) 0.085
2nd to 3 rd sera 39 (26.5%) 32 (53%) 7 (7.8%) 4 (10.0%) 3 (6.0%) 0.695
1st to 3 rd sera 45 (30.6%) 32 (53%) 13 (14.4%) 9 (22.5%) 4 (8.0%) 0.071
GMT (95% CI)
Base line 11.0 (10.7-12.0%) 11.0 (10.5-12.6) 11.2 (10.4-12.1) 12.1 (10.5-13.9) 10.6 (9.7-11.5) 0.049
Second 12.4 (11.4-13.6%) 11.4 (10.4-12.4) 13.2 (11.5-15.1) 16.0 (12.6-20.3) 11.3 (9.9-12.9) 0.013
Third 19.2 (16.6-22.1%) 31.4 (23.8-36.8) 14.0 (12.0-16.3) 18.3 (14.0-24.1) 11.3 (9.8-13.1) 0.003
Abbreviations: GMT: geometric mean titer; CI: confidence interval.
1 Comparisons were made between high- and normal-risk groups, using Chi-square or Fisher exact tests.
2 See text and Figure 2 for definitions of baseline, second, and third samples.
3 See text for definitions of high- and low-risk.
Table 4 Univariate and multivariate analyses for factors associated with total seroconversion for 2009 pandemic
influenza A (H1N1) in 90 unvaccinated healthcare workers at a children’ hospital in Taiwan
Characteristics No. (median/mean) Crude OR (95% CI) P value Adjusted OR (95% CI) P value
Age per 10 years
1 (29.2/31) 1.45 (0.71-2.93) 0.305
Male sex 18 0.69 (0.14-3.45) 0.654
Baseline anti-H1N1 titer
2 (10.0/12.3) 0.36 (0.07-2.01) 0.245
High risk group
3 40 3.34 (0.94-11.80) 0.061 6.51 (1.13-37.52) 0.036
Optimal surgical mask usage 75 3.39E8 (0.00-∞) 0.998
Optimal hand hygiene 83 3.00E8 (0.00-∞) 0.999
ILI episode 21 12.19 (3.23-46.04) < 0.001 9.14 (2.02-41.36) 0.004
Virologically confirmed 2009 H1N1 infection
4 9 11.41 (2.54-51.32) 0.002 5.99 (0.98-36.48) 0.052
Abbreviations: OR, odds ratio; CI, confidence interval; ILI episode, influenza-like illness episode.
1 For every 10-year increase in age, for which integer values 0-3 denote ages of 20-30, 30-40, 40-50, and 50-60, respectively.
2 Unit increase in baseline titer, for which integer values 0-8 denote titers of < 10, 10, 20, 40, 80, 160, 320, 640, and 1280 or more, respectively.
3 HCWs in direct contact with patients with 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infection or their respiratory samples were designated high-risk group.
4 Virologically confirmed means either viral isolation or real time polymerase chain reaction was positive of 2009 H1N1 influenza virus.
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Page 7 of 9care workers (11%) significantly lower than that in normal
(44%) military personnel [17]. A higher alertness and strict
PPE compliance by HCWs account for the low serocon-
version rates observed.
HCWs with diverse daily tasks actually differ in risk
level for contracting H1N1 virus. Those in direct contact
with ILI patients or their samples presumably face higher
risk. Nurses working in 2009 pandemic influenza A
(H1N1) isolation wards and coming in contact with
infected colleagues showed independent occupational
risk factors for seroconversion [13]. Data confirmed high
risk or direct contact with influenza patients and their
respiratory samples as independent risk factors for sero-
conversion (Table 4), yet suboptimal surgical mask usage
or hand hygiene as independent risk factors, obviously
because high- or low-risk participants had good adher-
ence to PPE usage (100% for high- and 70.2-87.7% for
low-risk). Surgical masks were cited as effective as N95
respirators in preventing laboratory-confirmed influenza
infections [18,19]. The World Health Organization
recommends surgical masks for all patient care, other
than N95 masks for aerosol generation procedures. Rein-
forcement of current strategies is justified.
Taiwan’s first pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infection
was confirmed in May and remained very rare until early
July 2009. When we began this study in August, 4.7% of
our subjects already had protective antibodies against the
newly emerged virus; 6.0% had ILI prior to first sampling.
One possible explanation is the virus spreading more
widely and rapidly than previously thought. Our earlier
study showed subjects vaccinated with seasonal influenza
vaccines unlikely to have cross reactivity to this virus
[20]. Another possibility is that the 2009 influenza A
(H1N1) virus shared antigen similarities with older influ-
enza strains. Prevalence of cross-reactive antibodies to
the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) virus in adults aged 18-60
were 0-13% from studies in the U.S., Australia, UK, and
Finland [21-24].
Improving the vaccination coverage rate among HCWs
is one priority in combating future influenza epidemics.
One US national health objective for 2010 was to achieve
60% HCW vaccination coverage. Overall vaccination
rates of monovalent 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1)
vaccines were about 70% for school age children and ado-
lescents, 11% for adults, and 30% for preschoolers in
Taiwan [25]. Coverage rates for HCWs in the current
study fell somewhere among 57.0% for high- versus only
12.3% for low-risk. Such disparity might emanate from
lower perceived risk. Results suggest that as long as
HCWs follow current infection control guidelines, risk of
infection in any healthcare setting is quite low. Monova-
lent pandemic influenza A (H1N1) vaccine in this study
has immunogenicity of 90% or higher in adolescents
and adults [9,10]; data suggest rapid decline of vaccine-
induced influenza antibodies. A mere 56.7% (34/60) of
vaccinees have detectable seroprotective antibodies three
to four months after vaccination.
Discrepancy arose between the number of subjects
reporting ILI (n = 25) and those showing laboratory evi-
dence of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infection
(n = 15). Good serological studies can normally identify
asymptomatic infections and yield more infections than
clinical ILI; data suggests self-reported ILI as lacking speci-
ficity, especially during a major influenza pandemic. Seaso-
nal influenza H3N2 virus infections, plus other respiratory
viruses like rhinovirus and adenovirus co-circulated in the
early stage of 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) in Tai-
wan. More than 86% of study subjects reported acute
respiratory illness during this study (Table 2). People tend
to be more sensitive and might exaggerate symptoms dur-
ing a pandemic. Many common colds caused by other
viruses might be reported as ILI.
Our current study shows several limitations. First, the
number of participants was relatively small, all from one
hospital. Receiving H1N1 vaccinations likewise
decreased number of subjects eligible for certain analy-
sis. Unexpectedly, low seroconversion rates in our sub-
jects may distort identification of true risk factors.
Finally, self-administered questionnaires can raise biased
information on clinical symptoms.
Conclusion
A moderate proportion (12.0-16.7%) of HCWs at a chil-
dren’s hospital in Taiwan were infected during the 2009
pandemic. Direct contact of H1N1 patient and their
respiratory specimen is an independent risk factor for
getting the infection. Proper use of surgical masks and
other protective devices offer reasonable protection but
do not reduce the need for influenza vaccination.
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